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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The rise of China’s steel sector, along with other manufacturing industries, presents issues 
beyond trade law enforcement. China’s quest for industrial raw materials is having considerable effect on 
global demand and supply, and as a result, the prices and availability of such inputs. China’s restrictions 
on exports of some raw materials, allegedly, lower the cost of such raw materials in the home economy, 
while increasing global prices of these products (or diminishing global supply), thereby producing an 
unfair advantage in some manufacturing industries. 
Amid the rising trade cases against various Chinese steel imports, Congress became increasingly 
concerned over alleged unfair trade competition from China. In August 2010, legislative measures were 
introduced in the Senate (S. 3725), while a set of measures focusing on illegal import practices were 
proposed by the U.S. Commerce Department, both aiming to continue the rigorous and more effective 
enforcement of U.S. trade laws. 
This report provides an overview of China’s steel industry and discusses the issues and implications with 
regard to the U.S. steel sector. 
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Summary 
China’s steel industry has grown significantly since the mid-1990s. China is now the world’s 
largest steelmaker and steel consumer. In 2009, China produced over 567 million tons of crude 
steel, nearly half of the world’s steel. That was 10 times the U.S. production. 
The majority of Chinese steel has been used to meet domestic demand in China. However, as its 
steel production continues to grow, overcapacity is becoming a major concern to Chinese 
industrial policy makers, as well as steelmakers outside China. Although industry statistics 
indicate that the Chinese steel industry is not export-oriented, its consistently high output keeps 
U.S. steelmakers concerned that excess Chinese steel might overwhelm the global market once 
domestic demand is adequately met. These concerns become increasingly acute as the United 
States and the rest of the world are in the middle of a slow recovery from the economic recession 
started in December 2007. 
The Chinese steel industry is highly fragmented, with more than 1,000 steel producers, which 
makes the domestic market highly competitive and difficult to control. Its growth also faces 
constraints such as dependence on imported iron ore and high energy consumption. The Chinese 
government has shown interest in stepping up its efforts to rein in steel overcapacity and to 
consolidate and restructure the steel industry. However, it remains to be seen if the government’s 
efforts and measures are to produce sufficient or meaningful results. 
The possibility of surplus steel from Chinese steel producers; their alleged questionable, if not 
illegal, trade practices; and the possibility of Chinese direct investment in the U.S. steel sector are 
all of major concern to the steelmakers in the United States. 
Steelmakers in the United States believe that China’s government subsidization of its steel (in the 
form of an undervalued currency, export rebates and/or quotas, subsidized financing, relatively 
weak environmental, labor, and safety regulations, etc.) is one of the key issues affecting the 
health of the U.S. steel sector. There have been multiple anti-dumping and countervailing cases in 
the United States against certain Chinese steel products, which suggests that U.S. steel producers 
and trade officials are increasingly using trade remedies to enforce international trade laws. 
The rise of China’s steel sector, along with other manufacturing industries, presents issues beyond 
trade law enforcement. China’s quest for industrial raw materials is having considerable effect on 
global demand and supply, and as a result, the prices and availability of such inputs. China’s 
restrictions on exports of some raw materials, allegedly, lower the cost of such raw materials in 
the home economy, while increasing global prices of these products (or diminishing global 
supply), thereby producing an unfair advantage in some manufacturing industries. 
Amid the rising trade cases against various Chinese steel imports, Congress became increasingly 
concerned over alleged unfair trade competition from China. In August 2010, legislative measures 
were introduced in the Senate (S. 3725), while a set of measures focusing on illegal import 
practices were proposed by the U.S. Commerce Department, both aiming to continue the rigorous 
and more effective enforcement of U.S. trade laws. 
This report provides an overview of China’s steel industry and discusses the issues and 
implications with regard to the U.S. steel sector. 
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Introduction 
China has become an increasingly prominent economic and political power, especially during the 
first decade of the 21st century. Since 1978, the year that officially marked the beginning of 
China’s economic reform, China and its steel industry have experienced rapid economic 
development. In the 31-year time period between 1978 and 2009, the real GDP growth rate of 
China averaged 9%.1 China’s emergence as a major economic power is a key factor in 
understanding and forecasting the global steel markets and prices. 
The global economic downturn, which began in December 2007, has considerably dampened 
industrial growth in developed countries. However, China continues its rapid economic 
development, in part propelled by the government’s fiscal stimulus package aimed at building 
infrastructure and spurring domestic demand. China’s economic growth in the second half of 
2009 and in early 2010, reportedly, was fueled by a massive increase in bank lending.2 
Questions remain concerning how long China can manage to sustain such rapid economic growth 
rates. Concerned about an overheated economy, which could result in high inflation, the Chinese 
central government recognized the need for a measured slowdown of its economic growth. In 
mid-April 2010, the Chinese government introduced a package of measures to discourage 
property speculation and, therefore, to prevent a possible property market bubble. Meanwhile, the 
central government also ordered the banking sector to limit lending to local government 
infrastructure projects.3 
What concerned the U.S. steel industry and, to a certain extent, all non-China steelmakers, is that 
as China adds new and modernized steel capacity, it will be used increasingly to export surplus 
steel as domestic demand is met. Such concerns are exacerbated by stagnant steel demand in the 
United States, as the overall economy is still in a slow and fragile recovery from economic 
recession. Moreover, U.S. steelmakers have long alleged that Chinese steel and steel product 
exports are not only unfairly subsidized but also employ questionable, if not illegal, trade 
practices. 
The issues for Congress include (1) whether China’s steel capacity is being expanded beyond its 
domestic needs and being dumped on world markets; (2) whether Chinese control on exports of 
critical industrial inputs, such as rare earth metals, provides an unfair advantage to Chinese 
steelmakers and other manufacturers; (3) what actions, if any, should be taken to ensure that the 
Chinese currency exchange rate does not provide an unfair advantage to Chinese steel exporters; 
and (4) whether the U.S. government has sufficient resources allocated to combat attempts to 
evade trade duties, ensure the safety of imported products, and enforce U.S. trade laws. 
World Steel Dynamics, Chinese Steel Hits the Great Wall, Core Report H (May 2009), p. 13. 
Ibid. 
Financial Times, “All eyes on Beijing to drive world growth,” July 12, 2010. 
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Overview of China’s Steel Industry 
China’s steel industry, along with a number of other key industries such as the automotive, textile, 
and petrochemical industries, is considered critical to the overall performance of the Chinese 
economy. The steel industry is considered a barometer of the overall economy. Similar to its 
automotive industry, China’s steel industry is relatively young, with a humble beginning. 
In 1949, the year the People’s Republic of China was established, China’s crude steel output was 
a negligible 158,000 tons. Chinese steel production then was highly concentrated in the northeast 
region, largely because of the Japanese influence and occupation before and during World War II. 
In the 1950s, with assistance from the former Soviet Union, which borders the northeast region of 
China, the Chinese government started to build steelmaking capacity. By 1957, China’s annual 
steel production was over 5.3 million tons.4 
After the political rift between China and the Soviet Union, which withdrew its assistance in 
1961, the Chinese economy underwent further disruption during the Cultural Revolution (1966-
1976). Chinese steel development suffered a severe setback: steel output in 1970 was lower than 
in 1960.5 
The Chinese economy went through stagnation, if not setbacks, during over two decades’ 
interregnum from the time Mao came to power in the 1950s until his successor, Deng Xiaoping, 
began the economic reforms in the late 1970s. As the whole country opened up gradually to the 
world and adopted a more market-oriented approach, so did China’s steel industry. 
During the economic reforms, steelmakers not only began to adopt more advanced technology 
from foreign steel producers, but also started to welcome foreign investment and imports of raw 
materials. China’s flagship steelmaker, now a major global producer, Shanghai Baosteel, was 
built in the late 1970s and early 1980s.6 In 2009, Shanghai Baosteel was ranked the second-
largest steel manufacturer in the world (see Ta b le 1 ). 
In the 1980s, China was a major importer of foreign steel, since its domestic steel production was 
not able to keep up with domestic demand. Many industrialized countries, back then, concluded 
that China’s principal significance in the global steel market had been as a huge market for 
exported steel, as noted in Steel and the State, a book on the steel industry in the 1970s and 1980s 
by Thomas Howell, William Noellert, Jesse Kreier, and Alan Wolff: 
4
 Institute of Industrial Economies, Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), China’s Industrial Development 
Report 2009 (Beijing, China: Economy & Management Publishing House, Sept. 2009 ed.), p. 248. 
5
 Howell, Noellert, Kreier, and Wolff, Steel and the State, Economic Competition Among Nations Series (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1988 ed.), p. 367; Institute of Industrial Economies, Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS), 
China’s Industrial Development Report 2009 (Beijing, China: Economy & Management Publishing House, Sept. 2009 
ed.), p. 251. 
6
 Baosteel corporate website (http://www.baosteel.com/group_e/02about/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=1384), as viewed 
on March 22, 2010; “About Baosteel Group Co.,” a presentation prepared by Baosteel Co. Construction of Baosteel 
(also known as Baoshan Steel, and Baoshan Iron & Steel Co.) started in December 1978. The first phase of the project 
was completed in 1985 for steel production; the second stage in 1991; and the third in 2000. Japanese and West 
German steel companies participated in the early stage, as mentioned in Jim Mann’s book, Beijing Jeep: A Case of 
Western Business in China (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977 ed.), p. 66. 
Congressional Research Service 2 
China’s Steel Industry and Its Impact on the United States: Issues for Congress 
Chinese apparent consumption of crude steel in 1986 was 75.7 million metric tons, more 
than twice that of West Germany, but its production was only 51.9 million metric tons. 
The longstanding gap between Chinese production capability and demand has created the 
largest national export market in the world outside of the united States.… China has 
absorbed a substantial portion of the western world’s surplus production.7 
Table 1. World’s To p Steel Companies, 2009 
Global Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Company 
ArcelorMittal 
Baosteel 
POSCO 
Nippon Steel 
JFE Steel 
Jiangsu Shagang 
Tata Steel 
Ansteel 
Severstal 
Evraz 
U.S. Steel 
Shougang 
Gerdau 
Nucor 
Wuhan 
Steel Authority of India Ltd. 
Handan 
Riva 
Sumitomo 
ThyssenKrupp 
HQ Country 
Luxemburg 
China 
South Korea 
Japan 
Japan 
China 
India 
China 
Russia 
Luxemburg 
United States 
China 
Brazil 
United States 
China 
India 
China 
Italy 
Japan 
Germany 
2009 Output (mmt) 
77.5 
31.3 
31.1 
26.5 
25.8 
20.5 
20.5 
20.1 
16.7 
15.3 
15.2 
15.1 
14.2 
14.0 
13.7 
13.5 
12.0 
11.3 
11.0 
11.0 
Source: World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures 2010, p.8. 
By the end of the 1980s, the rapid growth of the Chinese economy led to a sharp increase in steel 
demand, and China’s continuing dependency on imported steel became “one of the important 
factors restricting the development of the national economy.”8 
One principal objective of China’s seventh five-year plan was to grow steel production to 60 
million metric tons by the end of 1990, and to 80 million tons by 1995. In reality, China surpassed 
these goals, producing 61 million tons of crude steel in 1989, and 95 million tons in 1995.9 
7
 Howell, Noellert, Kreier, and Wolff, Steel and the State, Economic Competition Among Nations Series (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1988 ed.), p. 366. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 International Iron and Steel Institute (now World Steel Association), World Steel in Figures 1990, p. 3. 
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China Becomes Top Steel Producer and Consumer 
In 1995, China’s steel production reached 95 million metric tons (mmt), about the same amount 
produced by steelmakers in the United States that year. In 1996, Chinese steel output went 
beyond 101 mmt, passing the 100-mmt mark for the first time, as China overtook Japan to 
become the world’s largest steel producer. China has held the title of the world’s largest steel 
producer since 1996. 
Figure 1 illustrates the speed and magnitude with which China has become the world’s top steel 
producer, especially since 2000. In 2003, China produced 222 mmt of steel, more than United 
States’ and Japan’s combined output. In 2009, China produced about half of the world’s steel, 10 
times the U.S. production. One notable fact is, unlike most major steel-producing countries whose 
production was curtailed considerably due to the economic recession, Chinese steel output grew 
by 13.5% in 2009 from 500 mmt in 2008. In 2009, China accounted for about 46% of the world’s 
total crude steel output, which represents a considerable increase from its share of 16% in 1999. 
This high production level was supported by China’s domestic steel demand, spurred by strong 
economic growth during the first decade of the 21st century. 
Figure 1. Crude Steel Production, 1995-2009 
Million Metric Tons 
600 
500 
400 
300 
200 
100 £ 
0 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
• U . S . • J a p a n • R u s s i a India China 
Source: World Steel Association. 
The World Steel Association (formerly known as the International Iron and Steel Institute), an 
industry association representing steel producers globally, compiled a list of major steel producers 
in annual steel output tonnage. Tab l e 1 provides a list of the world’s top 20 steel companies in 
2009. It is worth noting that Chinese production rose sharply in 2009, while steel output in most 
industrialized countries declined. Tab le 2 lists the top 20 steel-producing countries. In 2009, 
China produced 567 mmt of steel, 10 times as much as the United States and over 6 times as 
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much as the world’s second-largest steel producer, Japan. Six Chinese steel companies were 
among the global top 20 steel producers in 2009. 
Table 2. To p Steel-Producing Countries, 2009 
Million Metric Tons of Crude Steel Production 
Rank 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
Country 
China 
Japan 
Russia 
United States 
India 
South Korea 
Germany 
Ukraine 
Brazil 
Turkey 
Italy 
Taiwan, China 
Spain 
Mexico 
France 
Iran 
United Kingdom 
Canada 
South Africa 
Poland 
2009 
567.8 
87.5 
59.9 
58.1 
56.6 
48.6 
32.7 
29.8 
26.5 
25.3 
19.8 
15.9 
14.4 
14.0 
12.8 
10.9 
10.1 
9.3 
7.5 
7.1 
2008 
500.3 
118.7 
68.5 
91.4 
55.1 
53.6 
45.8 
37.3 
33.7 
26.8 
30.6 
19.9 
18.6 
17.2 
17.9 
10.0 
13.5 
14.8 
8.3 
9.7 
% Change 
13.5% 
-26.3% 
-12.6% 
-36.4% 
2.7% 
-9.3% 
-28.6% 
-20.1% 
-21.4% 
-5.6% 
-35.3% 
-20.1% 
-22.6% 
-18.6% 
-28.5% 
9.0% 
-25.2% 
-37.2% 
-9.6% 
-26.8% 
Source: World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures 2010. 
In 2009, the Chinese GDP growth rate was about 9%, an impressive number as most of the 
developed countries were still mired by the global economic recession. Many believe that such 
strong growth was largely, if not entirely, fuelled by the central government’s stimulus package, 
which has resulted in large amounts of outstanding bank loans, exposing banks to greater default 
risks. Further, it has been reported that the local Chinese governments (e.g., provincial, 
municipal, etc.) were likely to default on 20% of their stimulus bank loans, since many loans had 
been assigned to projects that were never meant to make large profits.10 This, inevitably, raises the 
question whether China’s rapid economic growth is sustainable. 
Although the central government, reportedly, has been trying to rein in its overheated economy in 
2010, the steel production in China during the first half of 2010 did not slow down. According to 
Financial Times, “China banks resigned to defaults” (July 28, 2010). 
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World Steel Association statistics, China produced approximately 323 million metric tons of 
crude steel during the first half of 2010. 
Steel Consumption and Capacity 
During the course of China’s rapid industrialization and urbanization, domestic demand for steel 
has increased. Commercial and residential construction, infrastructure building, and the rise in 
automobile sales, for example, all use significant amounts of steel. The major steel-consuming 
sectors in China are construction, automotive, shipbuilding, and home appliances. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between Chinese steel supply and demand between 1995 and 
2009. As crude steel production continues to increase, especially from 2000, Chinese steel supply 
not only met domestic demand, but also began to outpace consumption. 
According to the Steel Statistics Yearbook published by the World Steel Association, China 
imported more steel products (semi-finished and finished) than exported, which made it a net 
steel importer for decades, until 2005. In 2005, China became a net steel exporter, and has 
remained so in the years that followed.11 
Figure 2. Chinese Steel Production and Consumption, 1995-2009 
MMT 
600 
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400 
300 
200 
100 
0 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Crude Steel Production Apparent Consumption 
Source: World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures: 2005, 2008, 2010. 
As China’s steel-producing capacity continued to increase, it did not take long to outpace the 
domestic consumption needs. This overcapacity problem became acute in 2006. By the end of 
2008, China’s steel capacity, reportedly, was 660 mmt, leaving approximately 160 mmt of excess 
11
 According to Steel Statistics Year Book released by World Steel Association: China was a net exporter of steel 
products from 2005 to 2009. This was also the case for the first quarter of 2010. Available data for first quarter of 2010, 
released by World Steel Association, suggests that China exported 23.28 million metric tons (mmt) of semi-finished 
and finished steel product, while importing 8.735 mmt. 
Congressional Research Service 6 
China’s Steel Industry and Its Impact on the United States: Issues for Congress 
supply.12 This degree of excessive capacity has adversely affected the overall profitability of the 
steel industry—every time steel prices started to attain profitable levels, steel mills with idle 
capacity would increase output, resulting in downward pressure on steel product prices. 
Nevertheless, there has been lingering caution, if not fear, that the global recovery is not likely to 
be swift or as strong as expected. China’s economic growth has been moderating from the fast 
pace set at the beginning of 2010. The Chinese government, reportedly, has been trying to cool 
down the economy and engineer a soft economic landing. There are indications that Chinese 
property prices are easing and the growth of car sales is slowing. In order to cope with sluggish 
steel demand and to minimize losses from unprofitable sales, many Chinese mills have opted to 
curtail output and/or maintenance outage in the summer months of 2010.13 
China’s Steel Industry Structure and Composition 
China’s steel industry has its own unique composition and structure. 
The Chinese steel industry, from iron and steel production to distribution channels and service 
centers, remains highly fragmented. According to a news analysis released on the official website 
of the Chinese government, there are reportedly about 1,200 steel manufacturers in China, albeit 
the exact count seems hard to confirm. Among these 1,200 steelmakers, about 70 are considered 
large or medium-sized producers.14 The rest are small steel mills, many of which are not equipped 
with modern technology and often are inefficient and/or cause environmental problems. 
Such a disaggregated structure, according to Chinese steel experts at China Iron & Steel 
Association, (CISA), has forced bigger steel manufacturers to expand production, often 
irrationally, to outweigh smaller competitors. Moreover, because steel companies tend to look 
after their own business interests, it has been difficult for large and small steel companies to form 
a united front and leverage bargaining power when negotiating price with international iron ore 
miners. The importance of iron ore supply and price will be discussed in further detail in a later 
section of this report. 
Almost all major Chinese steel producers are state-owned, except Shagang Steel, which is the 
largest privately owned steel company in China. As a result, the company is not as vulnerable to 
foreign trade suits involving anti-dumping or government subsidies as some of the state-owned 
steel producers. 
However, this does not imply that Shagang operates entirely in a market-oriented environment. 
According to World Steel Dynamics, an industry consulting and data services firm, even as a 
private enterprise, Shagang follows the guidelines that govern other Chinese steel companies: 
12
 “Analysis: Containing steel production capacity is fundamental to the healthy growth of China’s steel industry” 
(March 21, 2009) on the official website of The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, 
http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-03/21/content_1264845.htm, as viewed on July 21, 2010. The author of this CRS report 
used the original Chinese-language version of the document. 
13
 American Metal Market (AMM), “Chinese mills extend output cuts into Aug.” (August 3, 2010). 
14
 “Analysis: To revitalize the steel industry, China must increase industry concentration rate” (March 21, 2009) on the 
official website of The Central People’s Government of the People’s republic of China, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-
03/21/content_1264930.htm, as viewed on July 20, 2010. The author of this CRS report used the original Chinese-
language version of the document. 
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business expansion programs must be approved by the central and/or local government; the local 
government collects a portion of its value added taxes; and the top management personnel of 
Shagang are Communist Party members.15 
Supply of Key Steel-Making Raw Materials 
There are two main steel production technologies: integrated steelmaking, which uses the blast 
furnaces (BF) and basic oxygen furnaces (BOF), and the electric arc furnace (EAF). 
An important technological characteristic of China’s steel production is that crude steel is 
predominantly produced in blast furnaces and basic oxygen furnaces, which makes iron ore and 
coke critical raw materials to the steel industry in China. China produces sufficient coal and coke 
in this regard. However, when it comes to iron ore, China relies heavily on imports. 
The production of steel in integrated mills uses the classic BF and BOF technology. Iron ore, the 
principal ingredient to produce pig iron in blast furnaces, is layered with coke and limestone. Hot 
air is blown into the furnace, igniting the coke and melting the iron ore. The molten iron is then 
processed into steel by eliminating impurities in the BOF and, possibly, adding alloying agents. 
According to statistics released by World Steel Association, nearly 91% of the crude steel 
produced in China, by tonnage, comes from integrated mills, which use iron ore as primary 
charge.16 Because domestic iron ore production in China, both in terms of quality and quantity, is 
not adequate to meet the growing steel industry demand, more than half of the iron ore has to be 
imported. This has put China in a sensitive, if not vulnerable, position with regard to iron ore 
supply and prices. On the other hand, the surging demand for iron ore and other raw materials by 
China also appears to have changed the world supply-demand relations. 
Coal 
Coke is one of the key raw materials in steelmaking. It is made by baking coal in an airless 
furnace or oven at high temperatures. As the primary reducing agent, coke reduces iron ore to 
molten iron. 
As a major coal mining country, China is the world’s leading supplier of coke. It remained a net 
exporter of coal until 2008, when the demand for coal to meet its energy and manufacturing needs 
outpaced the domestic supply. In 2009, China became a net importer of coal for the first time. It 
bought 104 million metric tons of coal, including both thermal coal (used to fire power plants) 
and coking coal. 
This is not to suggest that the Chinese domestic coal production is insufficient. The reported 
Chinese annual output of coal was about 3.3 billion metric tons, the largest in the world. China’s 
shift to coal imports indicates that as the nation continues its industrialization and urbanization 
efforts, the needs for energy and manufacturing resources have grown considerably and are likely 
to remain strong. Meanwhile, the shift also reflects, in part, a government-backed drive to 
15
 World Steel Dynamics, “Shagang Steel: World Class Steelmaker” (November 11, 2009). 
16
 World Steel Association, Steel Statistical Yearbook 2009, Table 7. Approximately 42% of crude steel produced in the 
U.S. come from BF / BOF; Germany, 68%; Japan, 75%; South Korea, 56%; India, 40%. 
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consolidate the coal mining industry in China as well as to shut down illegal and unsafe mines. 
The consolidation drive started in Shanxi province, China’s leading coal producing province 
whose output accounts for more than 20% of the country’s total, and is moving to other big 
producing regions. Through consolidation, the Chinese government aims to improve coal industry 
structure and efficiency by eliminating tens of thousands of small local coal mines where 
outdated equipment, lax safety records, insufficient investment, and inefficient management have 
resulted in inefficient use of coal resources.17 
China is not the only force driving up world coal demand. India’s rising coal needs, along with 
those of South Korea, Taiwan, and possibly Vietnam in the near future, are contributing to the 
upturn in demand. 
China and the Global Iron Ore Market 
Iron ore is the world’s second-largest commodity market by value, after only crude oil. The way 
iron ore is traded has a huge impact on the global economy because any changes in the cost of ore 
are passed through to the price of steel and then to consumer products from cars to washing 
machines. On the other hand, ore price is critical too, for the profitability of the world’s major 
mining companies such as Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton and leading steelmakers such as 
ArcelorMittal and Baosteel. 
The world iron ore industry has become very concentrated, dominated by the so-called “Big 
Three”: Brazil’s Vale is the largest producer with approximately 310 mmt of capacity in 2009, 
followed by two big Australian mining companies: Rio Tinto with 220 mmt of capacity and BHP 
Billiton with 140 mmt. Almost all of their production is exported, and the “Big Three” command 
about a 75% share of the seaborne trade market.18 Therefore, the Big Three have controlling 
influence in determining global iron ore prices. 
China, as the world’s leading steel producer with ever-growing production capacity, feels it is 
crucial to secure iron ore supplies both globally and domestically, in order to plan, manage, and 
continue its industrial growth. China has become the major buyer of seaborne iron ore. Its ore 
imports have increased nearly eight times over the past decade, rising from about 70 mmt in 2000 
to 628 mmt in 2009.19 In 2000, China accounted for about 16% of global iron ore imports. In 
2009, it bought nearly 70% of global supplies.20 
Reportedly, China has an estimated 8,000 or more iron ore mines, but most of them are very 
small, and their production is not reliable. China has ramped up the domestic iron production in 
recent years. The total domestic iron ore output was about 180 mmt in 2009. However, small 
mines may be gradually closed during the 2010-2015 period, reducing the total production.21 
Moreover, there exists a crucial constraint regarding iron ore production in China. Most of the 
Chinese domestic deposits are low grade hematite ores, with high impurities and a relatively low 
Financial Times, “Commodities: A market re-emerges” (April 13, 2010). 
World Steel Dynamics, North American Iron Ore: Consolidated Survival, p. 97. 
World Steel Dynamics, North American Iron Ore: Consolidated Survival, p. 45. 
Financial Times, “Ore struck” (April 6, 2010). 
Ibid., p. 99. 
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iron content between 30% and 35%.22 Iron ore from Brazilian or Australian mines, by 
comparison, offers average iron content between 55% and 65%.23 
Until steel prices declined sharply in late 2008, iron ore traded only in limited amounts in the 
open market. Its key prices were set by annual contract since the 1960s. Starting in the early 
2000s, China’s rapidly expanding steel production and its demand for higher-quality ores 
transformed iron ore into a commodity in high demand on the global market. As a result, the 40-
year-old annual benchmark system began to shift.24 
China started to play a leading role in the annual contract negotiations and set the price for 2008. 
In the 2009 negotiations, the Japanese steelmakers were the first to settle, accepting a 33% 
discount to the previous benchmark price with Rio Tinto in May 2009. Chinese steelmakers, 
represented by CISA (China Iron and Steel Association, representing 100 member companies), 
rejected the agreement and demanded a 45% price cut. China never agreed to a 2009-2010 
contract price.25 
The Rio Tinto Case 
On June 5, 2009, Rio Tinto abandoned plans for a $19.5 billion capital investment from Chinalco, 
a Chinese state-owned miner which, reportedly, led to an embarrassment for the Chinese 
government. On July 5, 2009, the Chinese authorities detained four China-based Rio Tinto 
employees (dubbed the “Rio Four” by media), among whom three were Chinese nationals and the 
other was an Australian citizen with Chinese ethnicity. The Rio Four were accused of accepting 
bribes and stealing internal memos outlining China’s negotiation plan. CISA accused them of 
undermining its position during the negotiations by revealing commercial secrets to Rio Tinto.26 
In mid-July 2009, the Chinese authorities broadened a corruption investigation of its steel 
industry in connection to the Rio Four allegation. This led to questioning and detention of a few 
Chinese steel industry executives on alleged widespread bribery in business dealings. There were 
also allegations that the four Rio employees paid for detailed government trade and industry data, 
which gave Rio Tinto an edge in iron ore negotiations with Chinese state-owned steelmakers and 
22
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23
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24
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subsequently derailed the process.27 Two Chinese steel mill executives, reportedly, were charged 
with commercial espionage and bribery, fined, and sentenced to jail terms.28 
In March 2010, nine months after the Rio Four were arrested, a Shanghai court sentenced them to 
between 7 and 14 years in prison for bribery and commercial secrecy violations. Media were 
barred from the courtroom and parts of the trial were held in secret. With speculation ranging 
widely on the Chinese government’s motivations in this case, the foreign business community 
inevitably questioned if the main impetus for the trial had been political.29 
Despite the strains, Rio Tinto apparently moved to repair its relationship with China. In March 
2010, Rio and Chinalco reached an agreement to jointly develop an iron ore project in the western 
African country of Guinea. Chinalco is the largest shareholder of Rio, and China is Rio’s largest 
customer for iron ore, having bought $10.7 billion worth of iron ore in 2009 from Rio, which 
accounted for over 24% of Rio’s sales.30 
Iron Ore Trade Moves to Quarterly Prices 
The Chinese steelmakers, represented jointly by Baosteel and CISA, never concluded their iron 
ore price negotiations with the Big Three for 2009. The Australian miners, nevertheless, 
continued to supply China with ore at the prices settled by the Japanese and South Korean steel 
producers. 
As demand for iron ore (among other minerals and natural resources necessary to fuel industrial 
development) from China and other developing countries continues to increase, the importance of 
commodities seems to rise as well, both economically and geopolitically. 
The gap between China’s soaring demand and its domestic iron ore supply has made China 
increasingly dependent on imports. While the highly consolidated iron ore suppliers would like to 
retain control over supply and prices, the Chinese are becoming more adamant that they should 
have certain leverage as a major buyer. Meanwhile, the strong growth in demand, generated by 
China, has led to the emergence of a global spot market. In late 2008 and early 2009, it was the 
difference between iron ore spot and contract prices that led to a wave of defaults on annual 
contracts.31 
Steelmakers then walked away from their annual contracts and bought iron ore at much lower 
prices on the spot market. Such disruptions, perhaps also aided by the Rio Four case as well as the 
strained business relations between Chinalco and Rio, eventually led to the collapse of the annual 
contract system. In April 2010, a new quarterly price system was introduced by the miners. It uses 
27
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quarterly contracts, rather than the annual deals, and the cost is determined by an average of the 
spot market level instead of through bilateral and lengthy negotiations with major steelmakers.32 
The quarterly contracts, supposedly, will diminish the incentive for the steelmakers to default on 
annual iron ore contracts. 
This new pricing system, which was put in place in April 2010, has survived its first quarterly 
test. But it is still to be tested under various conditions, for instance, with prices going up and 
going down. While many steel company executives reportedly prefer a return to annual pricing, 
both sides agree that the inevitable gap between spot and quarterly prices still means the system is 
under stress and that the way ore is traded is still to evolve.33 
Although the implication of the movement (from annual contract price to the more volatile 
quarterly price) to the Chinese steelmakers remains to be seen, it will add uncertainties to the 
Chinese steel industry, which operates in an arguably market-oriented environment. To mitigate 
these uncertainties and to counter the market dominance of the Big Three suppliers, the Chinese 
steel producers are very likely to become more vertically integrated by aggressively seeking 
and/or acquiring new iron ore assets and suppliers. 
In July 2010, China Daily, a newspaper backed by the Chinese central government, reported that 
Wuhan Iron & Steel Group, China’s third-biggest steelmaker, would buy iron ore from Venezuela 
at a long-term contract. The deal was hailed as the encouraging “first-ever contract under the 
‘China Price’ separate from rates set by Big Three.”34 
China’s Quest for Iron Ore, Among Other Natural Resources 
With the central government’s encouragement and approval, China’s major iron and steel 
manufacturers have been actively seeking to secure supplies of raw materials. This wave of 
“going global” from China is not restricted to iron ore. The world has seen an increase in these 
activities since the global recession took place, which has weakened demand and kept the 
investment prices more reasonable. Another important factor is that many mining companies and 
resources-rich regions are looking for financial investments in a tightened credit market. 
China has emerged as a big buyer and investor seeking energy and mining assets all around the 
world. According to data tracker Dealogic, companies based in China or Hong Kong participated 
in $13 billion of overseas mining acquisitions and investments in 2009, one-third of the value of 
all cross-border mining mergers and acquisitions. This was about 100 times the Chinese 
investment level in 2005. In 2009, Chinese firms accounted for nearly 40% of all mining deals 
with foreign investors in Australia, historically a major destination for Chinese mining 
investments. In Canada, a relatively newer attraction to Chinese buyers, the rate was about 25%.35 
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In May 2010, six of the world’s biggest mining and steel companies joined in an exploration 
effort on an unprecedented scale in west Africa, where some of the world’s richest deposits of 
iron ore are found. These groups are Vale of Brazil; Rio Tinto and BHP Billiton of Australia; 
ArcelorMittal, the world’s largest steelmaker; Russia’s Severstal; and Chinalco, the state-owned 
Chinese mining company.36 
The Chinese government has not made any explicit public push for overseas acquisitions. 
However, the government states clearly in its “Steel Industry Revitalization Plan” that it supports 
steel sector companies to further explore and develop domestic resources as well as to seek 
resources and invest abroad. Some support from the central government came in the form of state 
loans.37 The acceleration of deals in recent years, many by state-owned enterprises, suggests that 
such acquisitions may be a priority. 
Rare Earth Metals38 
While China relies on foreign sources for iron ore, it has predominant control over the mining of 
the 17 rare earth elements (REEs). These 17 elements are essential for the manufacturing of many 
high-tech products from iPods to fiber-optic cables and military weapon systems. They are also 
important for the development of green technologies, such as wind turbines, and batteries for 
hybrid and electric cars. 
China produces about 95% of the world’s rare earth metals. The United States was once self-
reliant on domestically produced REEs but has become dependent on imports, over 90% of which 
come from China, because of lower-cost operations. The concentration of production of REEs 
outside the United States has raised the important issue of supply vulnerability. 
China has established domestic production quotas on REEs and has been cutting down export 
quotas for rare earth since 2005. It also increased export taxes to a range of 15% to 25%, 
indirectly raising prices for non-Chinese competitors. In July 2010, China announced that it 
would reduce its REE exports further in the second half of 2010 by 72%, the latest move to 
restrict exports of the metals.39 
It appears that the aims of China’s policy moves are not restricted to tight control over REE 
supply and prices. Similar to the encouragement from the Chinese government to promote exports 
of more value-added steel products, China seems determined to expand into the more profitable 
36
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and sophisticated downstream REE processing sectors instead of just being world’s supplier of 
raw materials. While accelerating the consolidation and restructuring of the fragmented REE 
mining industry, China has indicated that it expects foreign companies to set up rare earth 
processing plants in China in its so-called “technology for market” strategy.40 
The U.S. Congress is increasingly concerned about access to rare earth raw materials and 
downstream products used in many national security applications as well as clean energy 
applications. Legislative proposals H.R. 4866 (Hoffman) and S. 3521 (Murkowski) have been 
introduced in the 111th Congress to address the issues and to support domestic production of 
REEs. 
For more details on rare earth metals, their supply issues, and the related legislative activities, 
please see another CRS Report R41347, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, by Marc 
Humphries. 
China’s Steel Industry Policies and Measures 
As the growth of steel production and capacity accelerated between 2000 and 2009, the Chinese 
government has acknowledged its growing concern over industry overcapacity, which has 
become acute since 2006. This has added growing pressure on domestic steel prices and 
subsequently, the profitability of steel companies. 
The central government has been pushing provincial and municipal authorities to phase out 
obsolete capacity, usually by setting a target of total plant closures for the entire country and then 
disaggregating to regional targets.41 The government also is keen on encouraging consolidations 
and technological upgrades, and improving the overall industry structure. 
According to China’s Industrial Development Report 2009 by the Chinese Academy of Social 
Science, a state-backed think tank, China does not have sufficient natural resources and 
environmental capacity to be the world’s steel supplier. Therefore, from a long-term perspective, 
the steel industry should focus on meeting domestic demand and never be export-driven. This 
may explain why export tax rebates on certain steel products were lowered or abolished by the 
Chinese government between 2007 and 2008, when export taxes were levied on certain export 
steel products.42 
However, with the global steel demand, the priority for policy makers is to keep the Chinese steel 
industry stable. China’s Industrial Development Report 2009 stated that the Chinese steel industry 
should keep its share on the global market stable by making appropriate policy adjustments, 
using, for example, export quotas, export rebates, and increased export rebate rates on high value-
added products, etc.43 
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The Steel Industry Revitalization Plan 
In November 2008, the Chinese government unveiled its fiscal stimulus package worth RMB (¥) 
4 trillion (U.S. $586 billion), to boost domestic demand and avert an economic slowdown amid 
the global economic downturn. In 2009, the government announced a program of incentives to 
promote vehicle sales and home appliance trade-ins, which are considered major steel-consuming 
sectors. 
In spring 2009, the State Council, China’s cabinet, issued a set of three-year industry 
revitalization plans. These three-year plans provide the latest blueprint for the key industries 
deemed critical to the overall health of the Chinese economy. The plans for the auto and steel 
industries are the first that were approved and publicly released by the central government.44 
The Steel Industry Revitalization Plan (Steel Plan) was released on March 20, 2009. Some of the 
main objectives, as stated in the Steel Plan, are to modernize steel production through technical 
innovation and upgrades, control total output and eliminate obsolete capacity, improve industry 
structure and composition, and encourage global expansion while maintaining domestic market 
stability.45 
The Steel Plan reiterates the goal to contain production at a proper level through production 
control and elimination of obsolete capacity. The central government, according to the plan, aims 
to reduce steel output to 460 million tons in 2009, 8% lower than 2008, and to gradually increase 
production to 500 million tons in 2011. 
However, China’s reported steel production in 2009 was over 567 million tons, already 23% over 
the planned 460 million tons, and already surpassing the production goal for 2011. This obvious 
disconnect between the planned and real steel output raises the question about how realistic or 
believable these planned targets are. 
In early 2010, aiming to shut down small and inefficient steel mills, the Chinese government 
ordered the closure of blast furnaces smaller than 400 cubic meters as well as converters and 
electric-arc furnaces under 30 metric tons. It is also reported that the central government plans to 
shut down 6 mmt of outdated steel capacity and 25 mmt of iron capacity in 2010.46 
In June 2010, facing a stagnant global steel market and a gradually cooling domestic economy, 
the Chinese government pushed ahead and ordered more steel capacity be closed by the end of 
September 2010. The government increased the previously planned 6 mmt of outdated steel 
capacity to 8.25 mmt and 25 mmt of iron capacity to 30.47 It was also reported that some 40% of 
CISA’s 77 member mills adopted maintenance outages in July 2010 to reduce output after 
domestic steel prices dropped below production costs. Several major Chinese steel mills, 
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reportedly, would extend maintenance closures into August to manage output and minimize 
losses.48 
It appears that the central government is committed to restraining steel capacity growth. However, 
it may not be easy to strike a balance between curtailing steel capacity and maintaining an 
optimal industry growth. There is little certainty that steel capacity cuts will be in pace with the 
decline in Chinese domestic steel demand. Therefore, if and when these policy measures will 
bring effective and meaningful solutions to China’s over-capacity problem remains to be seen. 
The Steel Plan strongly encourages the industry to rapidly improve technology levels in 
steelmaking and become more environmentally friendly, in order to improve efficiency, reduce 
production costs, improve product quality, and optimize product offering structure. 
The Chinese government calls for mergers and acquisitions among steelmakers and increases in 
the industry concentration rate. The goal is to have the top five steelmakers holding 45% of 
Chinese steel output. It names Baosteel Group Corp., Angang Steel Co. Ltd., and Wuhan Iron & 
Steel (Group) Corp. as the leading steelmakers capable of global competition. 
The Steel Plan even provides guidance for the geographical location of steel production in China. 
One of the main objectives is to grow coastal and riverside steel manufacturers so that they would 
constitute 40% of national output. To reduce industrial pollution, the Steel Plan announces that 
steel companies in a few major cities would be relocated.49 
The central government calls for the steel industry to preserve the stability of iron ore imports and 
maintain market order. It also encourages steel manufacturers to further explore and develop local 
resources while supporting major enterprises that seek resources and investment opportunities 
abroad. 
State Council Facilitates Industry Consolidation and 
Environmental Improvement50 
On June 4, 2010, China’s State Council issued a circular to expedite industry consolidation and 
improve environmental performance in the Chinese steel sector. It reiterated the key components 
stated in the revitalization plan, and also introduced or updated some policy measures. A few key 
points include: 
1. Rein in steel capacity expansion—There will be no more approval for new 
capacity expansion projects until the end of 2011; any obsolete capacity that has 
been shut down shall not be replaced. 
2. Expedite capacity closures—Incentives and punitive measures, such as higher 
electricity prices, will be used to speed up closure of obsolete capacities; the 
48
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Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) will release a list of 
steel facilities to be forcibly closed. 
3. Facilitate industry consolidation—The production share of the top 10 steel 
companies is expected to reach 60% by 2015 from 44% in 2009; provincial 
governments are asked to have a consolidation plan at the regional level to be 
implemented in 2010-2011, with supporting measures including land access and 
financial resources to be adjusted accordingly. 
4. Improve environmental performance by promoting environmentally sound 
technologies and practices; increase EAF-based steelmaking and improve 
recycling rate of scrap. As a measure to encourage more efficient use of 
technology and raw materials, Chinese trade policy will be adjusted accordingly 
to curb the export of low value-added steel products. 
5. Support investment in technological advancement and product development, 
especially projects by key steel manufacturers. 
6. Regulate iron ore import activities and increase concentration of Chinese 
importers. Secure stable ore supply and keep ore price at reasonable level by 
increasing domestic output while supporting steelmakers’ investment in overseas 
mines. 
It is notable that the circular listed trade policy adjustment under the objective of environmental 
improvement. This trade policy adjustment was issued in June 2010. 
Tax Rebate Adjustment for Steel Products 
On June 22, 2010, the Chinese Ministry of Finance and State Administration of Taxation jointly 
issued certain adjustment of steel export tax rebates. This removed the export tax rebate for key 
commodities, including some steel exports, effective July 15, 2010. Some believe the move was 
designed to ease tension with trading partners in the United States and the European Union, who 
have expressed increasing concern over China’s steel export subsidies. It could also help to curb 
production overcapacity and speed up steel industry consolidation and restructuring, which the 
central government has tried unsuccessfully for years to achieve.51 
The adjustment covers 406 products, non-ferrous metals, fertilizers, glass goods, and chemicals, 
etc. The existing 9% tax rebates are to be abolished for 48 steel products, including some heavy 
steel sections, plates, hot rolled coil, narrow strips, and coated products, etc. However, tax rebates 
for most of the high value-added products, such as steel pipes, cold rolled coil, and specialty steel, 
remain unchanged.52 
This is the first tax rebate adjustment for Chinese steel exports since 2009. From April 2009, tax 
rebates of some high value-added steel products, such as cold rolled steel, alloy steel, and 
specialty steel, had been raised to 13%. In June 2009, export tax rebates for some other steel 
products were increased from a range between 0% and 5% to 9%. These products included heavy 
51
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sections, hot rolled coil, sheet, plant, narrow strips, most alloy steels, railway products, ductile 
pipes, a few seamless and welded pipes, and some steel-structured products.53 
Reportedly, the removal of export rebates and weaker steel demand did drive China’s steel 
exports down in July 2010. Finished steel exports from China totaled 4.55 million tons in July, a 
19% decrease from June 2010.54 However, it remains to be seen whether the Chinese steel output 
will remain under control in the long term, especially when market conditions improve as the 
global economic recovery picks up speed. 
The bottom line, it appears, is that the rebate rollbacks will cut exports of mostly low-end 
commodity-grade products. The effect will put more pressure on Chinese domestic steel 
producers and help the central government’s goal of closing older and polluting steel mills. 
Implications for the U.S. Steel Industry: 
Issues for Congress 
Chinese steel is used mainly in its domestic market. What has concerned the U.S. steel industry is 
that, as China adds new and modernized steel capacity, it will be used increasingly to export 
surplus steel after domestic demand is adequately met. When China hits a period of 
overproduction and surpluses, a natural reaction would be to export the excess steel. 
Steelmakers in the United States believe that China’s steel industry subsidization by its 
government (in the form of an undervalued currency; export rebates and/or quotas; subsidized 
financing; and relatively weak environmental, labor, and safety regulations) is one of the key 
issues affecting the health of U.S. steel sector. There have been multiple anti-dumping and 
countervailing cases in the United States against Chinese steel products, suggesting that U.S. steel 
producers and trade officials are increasingly using trade remedies to enforce international trade 
laws. 
In June 2010, China responded to heavy pressure by the United States and other members of the 
G20 major economies by announcing a more flexible currency standard. China’s decision to drop 
the two-year-old informal peg to the U.S. dollar was welcomed by the United States and other 
trading partners.55 But with the government’s insistence on gradual change, the timing and the 
magnitude of the Chinese currency appreciation and, subsequently, any meaningfully positive 
impact on the U.S. (and the global) steel market still remains unclear. 
For more detailed discussion on China’s currency and related economic issues, please see another 
CRS Report RS21625, China’s Currency: An Analysis of the Economic Issues, by Wayne M. 
Morrison and Marc Labonte. 
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Chinese Steel Capacity and Exports 
China has been on course to modernize steel production through streamlining the steel sector via 
closures and consolidation. As mentioned in previous sections, the Chinese steel sector still faces 
the challenge of over-supply and over-capacity, despite the commitment and efforts of its central 
government to tackle the problems. 
However, Chinese steel production does not appear to be export-driven. In other words, the 
majority of Chinese steel has been used to supply domestic economic growth. In 2009, largely 
spurred by strong domestic demand, China’s exports fell about 60% from the previous year to 23 
million tons, dropping its ranking as the top exporter in 2008. In 2009, Chinese steel exports by 
tonnage were behind Japan, the European Union, Russia, and Ukraine.56 China’s reported steel 
imports in 2009 reached 22 million tons, making the country the world’s largest importer.57 
Figure 3 is based on the annual steel statistics released by the World Steel Association. It shows 
that the Chinese steel industry, along with those of India and the United States, is one of the three 
major national producers least dependent on exports. In the case of China, steel exports in 2009 
were 4% of output, while in India they were less than 10%, and in the United States they were 
nearly 16%. Three leading Asian producers outside China (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) had 
export ratios as high as 38%, 41%, and 62% of their respective production in 2009. Russia and 
Canada exported about half of their output, Germany 63.5%, and Ukraine over 80%. 
Between 2005 and 2009, China’s steel exports as a percent of total production were between 
4.2% and 13.5%, similar to those of the United States, which were between 10% and 16%. 
Figure 3. Steel Exports by Country, 2009 
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In terms of total steel mill products imported into the United States, by tonnage, over 30% came 
from the NAFTA countries (Canada and Mexico). In 2009, Canada and Mexico accounted for 
over 36% of the total tonnage of steel mill products imported into the United States, the European 
Union accounted for 16%, and China accounted for 9%, followed by South Korea’s 8.2% and 
Japan’s 7.5%. From 2005 to 2009, the Chinese share of total U.S. steel mill products imports has 
been between 7% (in 2005) and 15% (in 2008).58 
Even though steel industry statistics seem to agree with China’s position that it has little intention 
of creating an export-oriented steel industry, the potential exists that with China accounting for 
nearly half of global output, marginal shifts by its steel industry in the direction of increased 
exports may lead to considerable market disruptions for other suppliers. As global steel demand 
remains sluggish in 2009 and into the first half of 2010, and Chinese economic growth slows 
down, the concern of U.S. steelmakers is that the U.S. market may see an increase in steel imports 
from China. 
Steel Trade Development 
Steelmakers in the United Stated have long claimed that Chinese steel and steel products are 
unfairly subsidized by its government. According to Steel Market Intelligence (SMI), a steel 
industry consultancy, and a Eurofer (European Steel Trade Association) report cited in SMI’s 
newsletter, China supports its steel industry with a variety of mechanisms including grants, 
capital market interventions, preferential taxes, subsidized loans, access to below-market priced 
inputs, and nominal labor and environmental protection, among other mechanisms.59 
Chinese steel exports are assisted, SMI says, by an “intricate set of cascading value added tax 
rebates, export taxes, and even export quotas on inputs, plus tax cuts, export credits and other 
schemes provided by the Chinese state-owned financial institutions.”60 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Case Against Chinese OCTG Imports61 
On April 8, 2009, seven U.S. Oil Country Tubular Goods (OCTG) producers and the United 
Steelworkers Union (USW) filed complaints against Chinese OCTG imports, alleging that 
Chinese pipe has been illegally dumped and subsidized by the Chinese government, and 
therefore, has materially harmed domestic producers. This marks the biggest steel trade case 
brought against China before the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to date, and is 
valued at about $2.8 billion of subsidized Chinese steel. 
Preliminary determinations by both the USITC and the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) 
have ruled in favor of the U.S. producers in the countervailing case, saying that Chinese 
producers received subsidies, and placed countervailing duties ranging from 10.9% to 30.7%. 
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On November 24, the USDOC made its final determination on the countervailing case, lowering 
the average duties placed on Chinese producers to a range of 10% to 16%. On December 30, 
2009, USITC issued a final ruling in favor of the U.S. domestic petitioners, affirming 
countervailing duties from 10% to 16%. 
Meanwhile, the USITC and the USDOC also ruled in favor of the U.S. producers in the 
antidumping investigations, stating the Chinese companies were selling below fair market value. 
On May 4, 2010, following Commerce’s April 9 final decision, the USITC issued its affirmative 
determinations, upholding antidumping duties ranging from 30% to 99%, which were placed on 
the OCTG imports from China. 
The ruling of this high-profile trade case was welcomed and praised by the U.S. steel producers. 
The USW president, Leo Gerard, as quoted in American Metal Market (AMM), said that the ITC 
vote “makes it clear to American pipe workers and industry that the U.S. government will stand 
up against China’s violation of fair trade rules when domestic job losses and industry injury are 
clearly demonstrated.”62 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Complaints Against Other Chinese Steel 
Product Imports 
In 2009 and 2010, trade petitions against Chinese steel product imports have increased 
considerably. The U.S. Commerce Department and the USITC have separately granted a number 
of requests to impose tariffs on various categories of imports from China, after finding evidence 
that these products were subsidized and/or dumped in the U.S. market. 
These subsidized and/or dumped Chinese steel imports include drill pipe,63 certain seamless 
carbon and alloy steel standard, line, and pressure pipe,64 steel grating,65 and steel wire strand for 
pre-stressed concrete (PC wire strand).66 
In another anti-dumping and countervailing case against wire decking imports from China, the 
USITC ruled in favor of the Chinese producers. It determined that the U.S. producers of wire 
decking were neither materially injured nor threatened with material injury by Chinese imports, 
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and therefore imposed no anti-dumping or countervailing duty orders. This was the first steel 
product trade case of 2010 that went in favor of foreign producers or importers.67 
In August 2010, The U.S. domestic wire decking producers filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of 
International Trade (USCIT) in August 2010, challenging the July 1 decision by the USITC that 
unfairly traded imports of the product from China were not injuring U.S. manufacturers. The final 
ruling is pending.68 
Chinese Steel Plate Faces Anti-Dumping Circumvention Inquiry69 
On February 17, 2010, four major U.S. producers of carbon steel plate products asked the U.S. 
Department of Commerce to prevent another Chinese company from adding boron to steel plate 
in an alleged attempt to circumvent anti-dumping orders. 
The domestic plate manufacturers accused Chinese producer Wuyang Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. and 
importer Stemcor USA Inc. of importing cut-to-length plate products containing metallurgically 
insignificant amounts of boron in order to classify the plate as alloy product, which would be 
outside the scope of the anti-dumping order against certain cut-to-length carbon steel plate from 
China. It is alleged that the plate contains 0.0008% or more boron by weight. 
On April 23, 2010, the USDOC initiated an anti-dumping circumvention inquiry based on the 
complaints from the U.S. producers. Commerce, according to a notice in the Federal Register, 
intends to issue a final determination within 300 days of the initiation notice. 
In a similar case filed in 2008 involving two Chinese trading companies adding boron to steel so 
as to circumvent a U.S. anti-dumping order, Commerce issued a final determination in 2009 in 
favor of the U.S. producers.70 
China’s Export Restriction of Certain Industrial Raw Materials 
On November 4, 2009, the United States, the European Union, and Mexico jointly made a formal 
request to the WTO for a dispute settlement panel to address China’s export restrictions on raw 
materials.71 The Chinese export restraints on numerous raw materials, allegedly, “significantly 
distort the international market and provide preferential conditions for Chinese industries that use 
these raw materials.” The raw materials at issue are bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium, 
manganese, silicon metal, silicon carbide, yellow phosphorus, and zinc, which are used by the 
steel, aluminum, automotive, and chemicals industries.72 
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China, allegedly, imposes quotas on exports of bauxite, coke, fluorspar, silicon carbide, and zinc, 
as well as certain intermediate products incorporating some of these inputs. It also levies export 
duties on several raw materials and imposes other export restrictions through its export 
procedures.73 The United States charges that such industrial policies are intended to lower raw 
material prices for Chinese manufacturers, especially in the steel, aluminum, and chemicals 
sectors, in order to help them obtain an unfair competitive advantage. 
The WTO’s biennial trade policy review for China, which was released in June 2010, suggested 
that the WTO was not entirely satisfied with the application of China’s resource export controls, 
stating that “export restraints for whatever reason tend to reduce export volumes of the targeted 
products and divert supplies to the domestic market, leading to a downward pressure on the 
domestic pieces of these products. The resulting gap between domestic prices and world prices 
constitute implicit assistance to domestic downstream processors of the targeted products and 
thus provides them a competitive advantage.”74 
China claims that these measures are intended to conserve exhaustible natural resources and 
protect the environment. The final ruling on this WTO case is still pending. 
Chinese Direct Steel Investment in the United States 
China has been seeking to curb its steel overcapacity while maintaining stabilized growth. At 
home, the government appears to have expedited efforts to consolidate and restructure the 
industry. Overseas, it has encouraged steel producers to acquire and invest in mining, energy, and 
manufacturing sectors. While the majority of industrialized countries, including the United States, 
are slowly recovering from the economic downturn, such moves from Chinese companies could 
face challenges and resistance from the targeted company and/or its host country. 
A proposed joint venture between one of China’s leading steel producers and a U.S. steel 
company has drawn deep concerns from the U.S. steel industry as well as lawmakers. 
In May 2010, China’s Anshan Iron & Steel Group Corp. (Anshan, also known as AnSteel), a 
major state-owned steel manufacturer, announced its plan to invest in an Amory, Mississippi-
based U.S. steel mill, Steel Development Corp. (SDCO). Anshan agreed to provide financial 
investment and to build five mini-mills in the United States, four of them to produce reinforcing 
bars and a fifth to make flat-rolled steel products. The Chinese producer said that it would like to 
gain insight into electric furnace technology, to obtain experience in lowering energy 
consumption, and to curb dependence on imported iron ore.75 
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This infusion of investment capital from China has sparked controversy in the United States. The 
Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA) and the American Iron & Steel Institute (AISI) called on 
federal regulators to carefully examine the investment plan, raising concerns about the Chinese 
government financing in steel capacity and the lack of reciprocity that would allow a U.S. steel 
company to build similar manufacturing facilities in China.76 
On July 2, 2010, 50 members of the U.S. Congressional Steel Caucus wrote to Treasury Secretary 
Tim Geithner, urging that Anshan’s joint-venture plan should be thoroughly investigated by the 
Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S (CFIUS). CFIUS, the inter-agency committee 
headed by the Treasury secretary, formally conducts classified reviews of foreign takeovers of 
U.S. assets on security grounds and can recommend that the U.S. President block a transaction. 
The caucus describes the proposed deal as a threat to “economic security,” stating in the letter that 
the investment by a state-controlled Chinese company provides several unfair trade advantages to 
both the Chinese and to SDCO, and that it will eventually lead to the loss of American 
manufacturing jobs and the further migration of the U.S. manufacturing base. Worse, according to 
the Steel Caucus, the joint venture could give China “access to new steel production technologies 
and information regarding American national security infrastructure projects.”77 
Debates over “economic security” are often built on the argument that U.S. companies cannot 
compete against foreign state-owned entities in the U.S. market that are viewed as having a 
limitless check book. In 2005, China National Offshore Oil Co. (CNOOC) launched an $18.5 
billion bid for Unocal, a California oil company. CNOOC withdrew the offer after strong 
opposition from U.S. lawmakers for fear that CNOOC had an unfair advantage. Soon after, 
Unocal was acquired by Chevron, the U.S. oil company.78 
Secretary Geithner responded 10 days later to the Anshan-SDCO complaint, telling the Steel 
Caucus that Treasury was “aware of the proposed transaction” but promising no action. 
Considering the response inadequate and disappointing, the Steel Caucus wrote a letter to the 
White House seeking a federal investigation of the deal.79 
In August 2010, Anshan confirmed it was committed to pushing forward the planned joint 
venture, after an executive of its subsidiary said the deal was on hold due to opposition from U.S. 
lawmakers.80 In September 2010, Anshan and SDCO finalized a joint-venture agreement, under 
which Anshan will become a 14% partner of SDCO and join its board of directors.81 
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However, not all Chinese direct investment in the steel sector has faced such disapproval from the 
U.S. industry or regulators. 
Chinese oil country tubular goods producer Tianjin Pipe (Group) Corp. (TPCO) plans to build a 
$1 billion greenfield pipe mill in San Patricio County, Texas. The mill is set to employ about 600 
people. TPCO’s investment has been welcomed by local development officials and building 
trades unions. Despite opposition by the United Steelworkers union, the mill received crucial 
regulatory approval in April 2010, and does not seem to have experienced the same political 
pressure that Anshan has been facing.82 
Although the ultimate outcome of the Anshan-SDCO deal remains unclear at this point, it is likely 
that the world will see more Chinese investment in the near future. Anshan, along with other 
Chinese manufacturers, is reacting to domestic and international pressure for Chinese steel mills 
to control output and to look overseas for growth opportunities. If Chinese currency, the 
renminbi, were to appreciate further, such overseas investments would become more attractive to 
Chinese business enterprises.83 
Congressional and Legislative Reaction 
Introduction of S. 3725: The Enforcing Orders and Reducing 
Circumvention and Evasion Act of 2010 
On August 5, 2010, Senators Wyden and Snowe introduced the Enforcing Orders and Reducing 
Circumvention and Evasion Act of 2010 (the Enforce Act), S. 3725, which would provide the 
U.S. Commerce Department tools to improve enforcement of U.S. trade laws. 
The legislation states that exporters from developing countries, in particular China, have been 
known to mislabel shipments and re-route goods through third-party countries in an attempt to 
mislead customs officials and to circumvent U.S. trade laws. 
The Senators, along with nine colleagues, also sent a letter to the White House urging the Obama 
Administration to do more to combat unfair trade practices. In the letter, the Senators called on 
the Administration to address China’s alleged practice of currency manipulation, among other 
illegal trade practices.84 
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The Enforce Act is designed to combat the evasion of anti-dumping and countervailing duty 
orders and enforce existing trade remedy statutes, by empowering the U.S. Commerce 
Department to investigate trade remedy laws violations, establishing a rapid-response timeline by 
which Commerce and U.S. Customs would respond to allegations, and improving the safety of 
imports. 
U.S. Trade Law Proposal85 
On August 26, 2010, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gary Locke announced 14 proposed measures 
focused on illegal import practices from non-market economies. These steps aim to continue the 
rigorous enforcement of U.S. trade laws. 
Some of the proposed changes: 
• Currently, foreign companies can be excused from anti-dumping (AD) and 
countervailing duties (CVD) by demonstrating that they were not dumping or 
receiving subsidies for a certain period of time. Under the proposed change, such 
companies could be removed from the process only upon the normal country-
wide expiration of those duties. 
• Currently, once an initial affirmative determination is made in an AD/CVD case, 
importers are able to post a bond in the amount of the estimated duties owned. A 
new proposed measure will require importers to post cash deposits rather than 
bonds to facilitate entry of their goods and services into the United States. 
Some other proposed changes would include improved methodology for determining the value of 
labor in non-market economy cases; tightening the certification process for the information 
submitted to Commerce as part of the AD/CVD case process; and strengthening specific rules to 
ensure that parties are paying the full amount of their duties. 
Steel and metals industries have long been pushing for stricter trade laws enforcement, especially 
with regard to what has been referred to as China’s mercantilist trade policies. Industry leaders 
and groups widely welcomed the new proposals, but some also maintained that China’s allegedly 
illegal currency manipulation as a key trade distorting practice, which is not included in the 
proposed measures, still must be addressed.86 
USW Files Trade Case with USTR87 
On September 9, 2010, the United Steelworkers Union (USW) filed a comprehensive trade case 
with the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), alleging that China has violated rules by subsidizing 
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exports of clean energy equipment. The case is filed under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, 
which sets an initial deadline of 45 days for the Administration to respond.88 
The filing of this petition comes at a time of increasing trade and currency frictions with China. It 
asks the Obama Administration to begin formal proceedings at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) to force China to repeal the subsidies. 
The petition contends that the Chinese central and provincial governments have used land grants, 
low-cost loans and a number of other measures to help Chinese companies expand their share of 
the world market for clean energy equipment, at the expense of jobs in the United States and 
other parts of the world. 
Besides Chinese government assistance to clean energy exporters, the USW petition accuses the 
Chinese government of breaking WTO rules by tightly restricting the exports of rare earth 
elements and by forcing foreign clean energy companies to license their technology to local 
partners as a condition of entry to the Chinese market. These issues have been discussed in a 
previous section in this report. 
Conclusion 
China’s emergence as the world’s largest steel producer and major manufacturing base has 
multiple ramifications to the United States and other countries. Its rapid growth in steel 
production requires an adequate and steady supply of raw materials. This means China will 
continue to have substantial influence over the global supply and price of raw materials and, 
indirectly, affect the production costs and profitability of its competitors. 
Meanwhile, China’s steel sector, with its own restrictions, may not continue the production 
capacity growth at the current rate. Lack of control over the supply and price of iron ore has been 
a major constraint. Other restrictions could be lackluster domestic demand caused by a slowing 
economy, high energy costs, and environmental implications. 
China has been seeking and securing natural resources all over the globe to support its 
industrialization and urbanization efforts. At the same time, the Chinese government has put 
export restrictions on rare earth elements exports and other raw materials critical to industrial 
production. This suggests that the Chinese government prefers to grant its own manufacturers a 
competitive edge over foreign producers. 
When China manages to assert more control over production inputs, the Chinese steel industry 
may be poised to significantly expand its share of the global production as well as the export 
market. Strict and timely enforcement of trade laws is important and helpful to the U.S. steel 
sector, when handling trade cases, albeit reactive. Adaptation of a consistent and long-term 
strategy is likely to serve the interest of the U.S. steel industry. 
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